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Abstract
The Supreme Court has clearly stated the general rule that sentencing lies properly within the
sound discretion of the trial judge and that, in exercising his discretion, a judge is not restricted by
technical rules of evidence.
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1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Supreme Court has clearly stated the general rule that sentencing
lies properly within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that, in
exercising his discretion, a judge is not restricted by technical rules of
evidence.' He can consider many sources and types of evidence "to assist
him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed
within limits fixed by law."' 2 This principle has also been expressed by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,3 and cases where an abuse of discre-
tion by the sentencing court has been found by an appellate court are
indeed rare.4
* B.J., University of Texas at Austin, J.D. Nova University Law Center, Law
Clerk for the Honorable Norman C. Roettger, Jr., Federal District Judge for the
Southern District of Florida.
This article was originally prepared at the request of Judge Norman C. Roettger,
Jr. for use at the Sentencing Institute for judges in the Southern District of Florida.
I. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079 (1949).
2. Id. at 246.
3. United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971) ("in absence of other
constitutional provision or of statute, this Court has no power to review the length of
sentence within the limits permitted by statute") Id. at 409; United States v. Menichino,
497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974) (sentence within statutory limit "does not ascend to the
orbit of a constitutional violation," Id. at 945, and sentence will be disturbed only for
abuse of discretion); United States v. White, 524 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975) (length of
sentence, if within statutory limits, is not a matter for consideration of appellate court);
United States v. Gamboa, 543 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1976) (sentencing court exercises broad
discretion, not subject to review except for arbitrary or capricious action amounting to
a gross abuse of discretion).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974) (sentence
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act [FYCA] which was harsher than that allowed
under the substantive statute was repugnant to the legislative intent of FYCA, and thus
an abuse of discretion. Also, a rigid policy of always imposing the maximum for drug
offenses is an exercise of no discretion and thus an abuse of discretion); Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042 (1974) (limited appellate review is available
when no sentencing discretion is exercised at all).
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However, as with all general rules, there are exceptions. Thus, a
criminal defendant at sentencing does retain some due process protec-
tion. He is entitled, for example, to rudimentary notions of fairness,5 to
have materially untrue matters in his record disregarded,6 to have con-
stitutionally invalid convictions disregarded7 and to be sentenced no
more than once for the same offense in compliance with the ban against
double jeopardy.'
2. AREAS OF CONCERN
From a survey of appellate opinions which deal with challenged
sentences, it appears that sentencing judges within the Fifth Circuit
should be aware of several issues which concern appellate courts and
which seem to recur with some frequency. Most frequently, the fact
situations giving rise to those issues occur: (1) when the sentencing court
may be considering another prior conviction which is constitutionally
defective; (2) when the court may be considering materially untrue infor-
mation or potentially unreliable hearsay; and (3) when the court has not
allowed the defendant to examine and attempt to refute information in
the presentence report.
A. Invalid Convictions
In United States v. Tucker,9 the Supreme Court held that sentences
5. See, e.g., United-States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1975) (ex parte memo
from prosecutor to judge deprived defendant of due process right to hear and rebut
information it contained).
6. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948). (Court erroneously
considered charges for which defendant had been acquitted. Supreme Court considered
these to be materially untrue assumptions).
7. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589 (1972) (two of three prior
convictions explicitly relied on by sentencing judge had been obtained in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright).
8. United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant sentenced
originally to 12 years, then prior conviction that the sentencing court had considered
was set aside. Relying on Tucker, the sentencing court vacated the 12-year sentence and,
considering defendant's criminal activity while on parole, gave him a 15-year sentence.
Held: not an abuse of discretion, but a violation of the ban against double jeopardy.)
See also United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
9. 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589 (1972). The crucial issue upon remand, according
to the Tucker Court, would be whether the sentence in the instant case would have been
different if the judge had known that the prior convictions were constitutionally invalid
2
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must be vacated and reconsidered when the sentencing court explicitly
relies on constitutionally invalid prior convictions. This decision was
reached after the Court discussed at length and expressed agreement
with the general rule regarding a sentencing court's wide range of discre-
tion.
This decision has led to circuit court opinions which offer refine-
ments to its general holding. Thus, in Russo v. United States," the court
held that, where a Tucker situation is asserted, the judge should "cause
the record to factually reveal the processes through which the Judge has
gone."" The procedure for this "factual outline" was stated in
Lipscomb v. Clark.2 There the court said,
First, the district court should review the records involved in this convic-
tion and determine if, treating the state convictions alleged to have been
unconstitutional as void and thus not to be considered in sentencing, the
five-year maximum sentence would still be the appropriate sentence based
on the records of the trial and petitioner's adjusted conviction record
(which would still consist of a twenty-five year sentence on a federal
counterfeiting charge). If the district court finds that the maximum sen-
tence would still be appropriate, an order so setting forth would seem
sufficient to comply with the requirements of Tucker. If, on the other
hand, the district.court finds that should these prior convictions be proven
unconstitutional and void that the maximum sentence would not be ap-
propriate, then it should grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing and allow
him to present evidence on his claim that the prior convictions in question
were unconstitutional due to Gideon. If the district court is convinced of
the validity of petitioner's allegations after such a hearing, it may then
properly resentence. Such a procedure seems best designed to fully pro-
tect petitioner's rights.' 3
However, the presence of constitutionally invalid convictions in a de-
fendant's record does not mean that Tucker automatically applies and
brings into play the Lipscomb procedure. In Rogers v. United States,"
the court held Tucker inapplicable because the sentencing judge had
and not whether the convictions would have been obtained even if the defendant had
been represented by counsel. Looking at the facts of this case, the Court said yes. Id.
at 448.
10. 470 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1972).
II. Id. at 1359.
12. 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
13. Id. at 1323.
14. 466 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1046 (1972).
107 1Judicial Discretion in SentencingI 3:1979
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"specifically certified that the sentence was not enhanced by the exist-
ence of the earlier conviction." 15 Tucker was also held inapplicable in
Houle v. United States," where the court relied on Canadian convic-
tions which were allegedly obtained without the benefit of counsel. The
court reasoned that Tucker was concerned with convictions invalid
under the United States Constitution, and the United States judicial
precedents "cannot be imposed on Canadian proceedings."'' 7 The court
explicitly stated that the Canadian convictions were permissibly consid-
ered by the sentencing court, and that the defendant was free to submit
any explanatory material concerning the circumstances of those convic-
tions."6
B. Untrue Information and Presentence Reports Disclosure
Closely related to the right to have invalid convictions disregarded
is the right to have materially untrue information also disregarded. This
principle was established by Townsend v. Burke," and has been rigidly
observed by the Fifth Circuit. In a recent case, United States v.
Woody, 0 the court construed Townsend as establishing a constitutional
right on behalf of a defendant "to know and to test the accuracy of any
statement in the presentence report upon which the judge relies."', In
that case, the court held that the judge's summary of confidential infor-
mation relied on was not sufficient to provide the defendant with any
notice of the nature of the information being held against him, and thus
15. Id. at 513-14. See Wheeler v. United States, 468 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1972) for
an example of where the appellate court remanded for a more particular description of
the sentencing court's reasoning. The statement by the lower court that he relied more
on the seriousness of the crime than on the invalid convictions in the presentence report
was not specific enough.
Another case which was remanded was United States v. Bishop, 457 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1972), where the sentencing court relied on convictions of a person who had the
same name as the defendant. Although the appellate court relied on Tucker, it would
seem that the same result would be compelled by Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68
S.Ct. 1252 (1948) which prohibited the sentencing judge from considering any facts in
the criminal record that are materially untrue.
16. 493 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 916.
18. Id.
19. 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948).
20. 567 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1978).
21. Id. at 1361.
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was not sufficient compliance with FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32(c)(3)(B).12
"[T]o do otherwise [not remand] would mean that we would be doing
no more than paying lip service to the right of the defendant to rebut
possibly erroneous information without providing a viable opportunity
for him to do so." 3
The court in Woody discussed at length the history and purpose of
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32(c), which deals with disclosure of contents of
presentence investigation reports.2 The rule has been interpreted to
allow wide discretion by the trial judge in deciding how much of the
report to disclose to the defendant. 25
Before the 1966 amendment to Rule 32,28 there was no language
22. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32 (c) (3) provides in full:
(3) Disclosure
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the
defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the pre-
sentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence, but not
to the extent that in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic
opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other information
which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the de-
fendant or other persons; and the court shall afford the defendant or his counsel
an opportunity to Comment thereon and, at the discretion of the court, to intro-
duce testimony or other information relating to any alleged inaccuracy con-
tained in the presentence report.
(B) If the court is of the view that there is information in the pre-
sentence report which should not be disclosed under subdivision (c)(3)(A) of
this rule, the court in lieu of making the report or part thereof available shall
state orally or in writing a summary of the factual information contained therein
to be relied on in determining sentence, and shall give the defendant or his
counsel an opportunity to comment thereon. The statement may be made to the
parties in camera.
(C) Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be
disclosed to the attorney for the government.
(D) Any copies of the presentence investigation report made avail-
able to the defendant or his counsel and the attorney for the government
shall be returned to the probation officer immediately following the imposition
of sentence or the granting of probation, unless the court, in its discretion other-
wise directs.
(E) The reports of studies and recommendations contained therein
made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the Youth Corrections Divi-
sion of the Board of Parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4208(b), 4252, 5010(e),
or 5034 shall be considered a presentence investigation within the meaning of
subdivision (c) (3) of this rule.
23. 567 F.2d at 1363.
24. Id. at 1358-61.
25. Id. at 1358.
26. That amendment added the following: "The court before imposing sentence
13:1979 109 1
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relating to disclosure by a court to a defendant of a report's contents.
Consequently, disclosure was made or withheld solely as a discretionary
choice of the individual judge.2?
The two-sentence amendment in 1966 to Rule 32(c) codified the
existing practice of allowing judges to use their discretion in determining
whether to disclose the contents of presentence investigative reports.
Although the 1966 amendment contained an Advisory Committee's
note that urged a policy of disclosure, the amendment failed to accom-
plish the goal intended by its draftsmen. 2
In 1975, the rule was amended again in an effort to encourage
disclosure.29 Now, the rule contains mandatory language, and it pro-
vides that the defendant and his lawyer are to be allowed to see the
report's contents unless the material falls into the enumerated excep-
tions contained in FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32 (c) (3) (A)? However, to
may disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant to
comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be
disclosed to the attorney for the government."
27. See 567 F.2d at 1358-59, n. 10, which states: "For example, in United States
v. Durham, 181 F.Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854, 81 S.Ct. 83, 5
L.Ed. 2d 77 (1960), the court held that presentence investigation reports are strictly
confidential and not to be disclosed to the defendant." See also Hoover v. United States,
268 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1959); Powers v. United States, 325 F.2d 666, 667 (1st
Cir. 1963). Other courts disclosed the contents of the presentence investigation report
and permitted comment thereon. See Shields v. United States, 237 F.Supp. 660 (D.C.
Minn. 1965); Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 1, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959).
A survey conducted in 1963 by the Junior Bar Section of the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia revealed the diverse treatment of the contents of presentence
investigation reports. Questionnaires were sent to 294 active district judges and 51 senior
district judges. The questionnaire contained the following question: "Is it the practice
of your Court to divulge any information contained in presentence reports to defense
counsel?" Of the 157 responses received, 63 (43%) stated that the reports were exhib-
ited to defense counsel and 83 (57%) stated that the disclosure was refused. The re-
sponse also indicated that 11 judges exhibited the entire report to counsel, 19 judges
provided excerpts of the reports to counsel, and 13 judges provided summaries. Junior
Bar Section of the District of Columbia, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33
F.R.D. 101, 125 (1963).
28. See Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968), where the court
noted the differing practices relating to disclosure by district judges.
29. For the text of the rule in its present language, see note 22 supra.
30. In a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, United States v. Ruiz, 580 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir. 1978), the court held that the disclosure requirements of the present rule can only
be activated by a request of the judge. The request may be made to the judge at the
1 I1 0
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promote disclosure and further the rule's intent, if a judge relies on
information that was withheld under one of the rule's exceptions in
imposing sentence, he must still provide an oral or written summary of
that information to the defendant or to his lawyer.31 It was the ade-
quacy of this summary that was at issue in Woody.
In Woody, the court also approved the Ninth Circuit's holding in
United States v. Weston,32 which required the setting aside of a 20-year
narcotics sentence that was based on uncorroborated hearsay testi-
mony.3 At sentencing, the defendant had staunchly denied the truth
of the allegations, and had been given an opportunity by the judge to
refute them. However, the appellate court felt the burden of "proving a
negative"-that she was not a large scale herion dealer as an anony-
mous informant had said she was-was too heavy.34
A similar case which dealt with allegedly untrue material in the
presentence report is Shelton v. United States.35 There, a defendant
convicted on income tax charges objected to the truthfulness of material
in the presentence report linking him to drug traffic. Citing a line of
precedent, the court held that Shelton should be afforded an opportunity
to refute the information.36 Upon remand, the court directed the sen-
sentencing, or by a prior written motion properly filed with the court. The court refused
to accept the proposition that an informal request to a probation officer is equivalent
to a formal request to a federal judge.
31. The policy behind the Rule's latest amendments is reflected in the Advisory
Committee's notes which state:
The Advisory Committee is of the view that accuracy of sentencing information
is important not only to the defendant but also to effective correctional treatment
of a convicted offender. The best way of insuring accuracy is disclosure with an
opportunity for the defendant and counsel to point out to the court information
thought by the defense to be inaccurate, incomplete, or otherwise misleading.
32. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. 567 F.2d at 1364.
34. 448 F.2d at 634.
35. 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. See also United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973) for an
example of where the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow the defendant
to refute factually the reasons given orally by the judge for the sentence, when the
defendant claimed that the reasons were factually erroneous.
By endowing the district court with discretion in sentencing, it is presupposed that
such discretion will be exercised consistent with both the appearance and reality
of due process. The action of the court below, in refusing to permit rebuttal of
the stated factual basis for the sentence, is tantamount to an abuse of discretion
and is inconsistent with the need for enlightened sentencing.
Id. at 558. United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1973) establishes a
I 3:1979
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tencing judge to weigh his authority to withhold the confidential con-
tents of the report against the defendant's rights to be fairly advised of
the information which formed the basis of that sentencing.
3 1
A case where inadequate disclosure was made to a defendant is
United States v. Hodges.3" The facts there indicate that the judge re-
vealed only portions of the information contained in the presentence
report and asked the defendant to refute it if possible. This was found
to violate FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32 (c)(3)(A) which, except for confidential
material and other limited exceptions, "removes the judge's discretion
to refuse requested disclosure of presentence reports. 39 After remand,
the court sustained the new sentence ° and strengthened its prior hold-
ings that the burden is on the defendant to show that his sentence was
based on a tainted record, and that the sentencing court actually relied
on misinformation in handing down the sentence."
3. SPECIFIC FACTORS
Despite these procedural safeguards afforded a defendant at
defendant's right to a hearing when he disputes factual matter so that he "may seek to
remove any lingering doubt the court may have had about the true situation." Id. The
Shelton court construed Rogers v. United States, 466 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1972) as
imposing the burden of showing that the trial judge relied on inaccurate information
concerning the defendant. 497 F.2d at 160.
37. Id. at 159.
38. 547 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 952.
40. 559 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1977).
41. Ia.at 1391. Cases distinguishing the Espinoza and Shelton line of decisions
include Uniied States v. Ashley, 555 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1977). Where a defendant has
been given an opportunity to refute information considered in imposing sentence, the
wide latitude allowed by Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) comes into play.
It is "essential that the [judge] '[possess] the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics."' 555 F.2d at 466, citing Williams. See also United
States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3rd Cir. 1976), where disputed material in presentence
reports did not invalidate the court's use of those reports. The court assured one de-
fendant it would not rely on a challenged allegation, and the other defendant declined
to have a court-offered evidentiary hearing. Id. at 684.
In United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974), the court found no
due process violation where defense counsel had been afforded an opportunity to exam-
ine and deny "anonymous accusations" of criminal activity against the defendant.
"Counsel for the defendant made an able and effective argument for leniency, and his
client received a sentence less than the statutory maximum. Since he did not ask that
sentencing be delayed, he cannot now object to its result." Id. at 945-46.
3:979 1Nova Law Journal
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sentencing, a judge is by no means confined to the strict evidentiary
rules which govern during trial. The wide latitude given to judges by
Williams has been, and continues to be, the law in the Fifth Circuit.
42
As an indication of some of the factors which have been permissibly
and impermissibly considered by sentencing judges, the following cases
have been summarized. The Fifth Circuit has held that a judge, in
imposing sentence, may consider a person's arrest while on bail awaiting
trial, even if it does not result in an indictment." Foreign convictions
may also be considered." The court has also stated, in general language,
that a judge may consider a defendant's activities, "including his rela-
tion to public and police authorities, his position in the community and
other factors" which aid the judge in balancing among "(i) punishment,
(ii) deterrence and (iii) rehabilitation."45 In sentencing narcotics law
violators, accurate information concerning a defendant's prior use of
cocaine "is an integral part of those factors which the sentencing judge
should consider in framing the appropriate sanction."" A judge, at
sentencing, may also consider a defendent's prior state law violations
which show a propensity to violate the law, or which show that he does
not respond to certain types of punishment.17
United States v. Bowdach" dealt with a sentence imposed pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §3575, the Dangerous Special Offender statute. It calls for
enhanced punishment if the judge makes certain findings, one of which
is that the defendant is dangerous, as defined in the statute. In that case,
the Fifth Circuit approved the sentencing judge's consideration of facts
underlying two firearms convictions that were overturned on appeal;
those facts were deemed relevant to finding the defendant dangerous for
purposes of the statute." The court also said that a sentencing judge can
consider "evidence of crimes for which the defendant has been indicted
but not convicted, and evidence of other crimes."5 A judge may not,
42. See United States v. Ashley, 555 F 2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1977), where the
court cites Williams as controlling authority, and additionally cites Houle v. United
States, 493 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir. 1970) cert. denied 398 U.S. 959, reh. denied 399 U.S. 938.
43. Houle v. United States, 493 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 916.
45. United States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) cert. denied
398 U.S. 959, reh. denied 399 U.S. 938.
46. United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1976).
48. 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 1175-76.
50. Id. at 1175. It is important to note, however, that a defendant, under this
13 113:1979
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however, in any situation, rely on hearsay computer statistics which seek
to establish how many sales a narcotics dealer may have made before
he was apprehended. 51
A defendant's associates, or his alleged status in the Mafia, can be
considered in arriving at a comprehensive judgment about a convicted
defendant.52 In allowing this, however, the Seventh Circuit pointed out
that it was in no way "advocating a policy of guilty by association."53
In the circumstances of a sentencing, where the person's guilt has al-
ready been determined, that problem is not present. "4
Where a defendant wins a right to be resentenced, the judge may
consider lawless behavior or criminal activity while on parole from the
earlier sentence. However, the limits of the first sentence may impose
double jeopardy restraints on the second sentence.55 Likewise, in a revo-
cation of probation hearing, the judge is not confined, in his considera-
tion of sentencing to the original crime or the offenses of which proof
was offered at the revocation hearing. He can permissibly consider the
defendant's progressive criminal history.56
A judge may also consider facts which are disclosed at trial, out of
statute, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before sentencing. At this hearing, the
defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and the right to cross
examine witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b). Thus, due process safeguards are provided. See
also United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court said that a
judge could permissibly consider a defendant's failure to cooperate with government
officials in their investigation of influence peddling, and evidence adduced at trial relat-
ing to counts of which the defendant was acquitted. This, however, is not the law in this
circuit. See text accompanying notes 66 and 67 infra. United States v. Martinez, -
F.2d - No.78-5204 (Nov. 22, 1978) indicates that a judge can also consider the
factual basis of counts in an indictment that are dismissed.
51. United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1976).
56. United States ex rel Sluder v. Brantley, 454 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1972). In this
case, the defendant was sentenced to 20 to 40 years on revocation of probation which
stemmed from a burglary conviction. The judge permissibly considered the progression
of criminal activity by the defendant which culminated in a kidnapping and alleged
aggravated statutory rape. Compare Hailer v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969),
where the court said that "a kidnapper's conduct towards his victim is of great relevancy
in determining sentence," Id. at 859, but nonetheless held that an ex parte communica-
tion from the prosecutor to the judge concerning the details of the conduct was a
violation of due process.
10
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the presence of the jury. For example, in United States v. Hodges,5 the
court held that the district judge had properly considered statements by
witnesses, out of the jury's presence, that the defendant had successfully
robbed other banks. Although on appeal the defendant claimed surprise
at the judge's reliance on those statements, they appeared in the presen-
tence report and the defendant declined to refute them at sentencing.
The court specifically found that the sentencing did not lack fundamen-
tal fairness.5"
In the Fifth Circuit, it is permissible for a judge to consider his
feelings that a defendant has perjured himself during trial. 9 However,
in the context of a new trial, it is impermissible for a judge to consider
the possibility that the defendant perjured himself, and then impose a
57. 556 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1977).
58. Id. at 369.
59. United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1976). In Nunn, the appellate
court adopted the words of Judge Frankel's opinion in United States v. Hendrix, 505
F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974), which said that the argument contending that consideration
of possible perjury amounts to a conviction without due process.
[It] ignores the nature of the sentencing process as it exists in our system and of
the factors the trial judge may consider in exercising a frequently enormous
range of discretion. If there is no clear consensus on these factors, it is certainly
clear that they include, as aggravating circumstances, conduct that is not literally
"6criminal," or at least has not been duly adjudged criminal in the case in which
sentence is being imposed.
The effort to appraise "character" is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not necessar-
ily an enterprise for which judges are notably equipped by prior training. Yet it
is in our existing scheme of sentencing one clue to the rational exercise of discre-
tion. If the notion of "repentance" is out of fashion today, the fact remains that
a manipulative defiance of the law is not a cheerful datum for the prognosis a
sentencing judge undertakes. Compare, Bazelon, C.J., with Leventhal, J., in Scott
v. United States, supra, 419 F.2d 269 and 282, respectively. Impressions about
the individual being sentenced-the likelihood that he will transgress no more, the
hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future
career, the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his
society-are, for better or worse, central factors to be appraised under our theory
of "individualized" sentencing. The theory has its critics. While it lasts, however,
a fact like the defendant's readiness to lie under oath before the judge who will
sentence him would seem to be among the more precise and concrete of the
available indicia.
525 F.2d at 960-61, quoting from 505 F.2d at 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974).
For further Fifth Circuit authority which allows a judge to consider the possibility
of perjury, see United States v. Gamboa, 543 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1976). This view is not
accepted by all circuits; see 525 F.2d at 960, notes 4 & 5.
115 11 3:1979
11
Sweet: Sentencing: A Discretio ary Judicial Function
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
116 Nova Law Journal 3:1979 1
harsher sentence after the second trial than that imposed after the first.6"
This was described by the court as an adjudication of guilt, "of the
crime of perjury without a presentment to a grand jury, without a trial
by a jury of his peers, without the right to present evidence in his behalf,
and without other procedural safeguards designed for the protection of
an accused."61 That conclusion, however, was reached on the basis of
double jeopardy considerations; not as an abuse of discretion.
Courts have also not been receptive to the argument that different
sentences for co-defendants convicted of essentially similar criminal
conduct violate a defendant's entitlement to equal protection. 2 As long
as sentences are within the statutory limits, courts generally will not
disturb them. 3 One case of disparate sentence dealt with two defend-
ants convicted of marijuana charges, wherein one received a six-month
prison term and the other received probation. 4 However, the defendant
who received probation had plead guilty and had cooperated with the
government. Since the sentence was within the statutory limits, it was
not reviewable on appeal as an abuse of discretion.65
Fifth Amendment considerations, however, do prevent trial judges
from relying on a defendant's failure to cooperate with the government
in imposing a harsher sentence than would have been imposed had he
cooperated.66 Likewise, a court may not penalize a defendant for not
"coming clean" after conviction and before sentencing.6 7 It is permissi-
ble, however, to consider as a factor among a range of others, that a
60. United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 1236.
62. United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
DeLaFuente, 550 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977).
63. 550 F.2d 309.
64. Government of Canal Zone v. O'Calagan, 580 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1978).
65. Id. at 165.
66. United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court
stated: "When it has been made to appear that longer sentences have been imposed by
the courts because the defendants refused to confess their guilt and persisted in their
claims of innocence we have vacated the sentences." Id. at 1085. The court termed the
comparison of the issues of confessing guilty with cooperating with the government as
a "distinction without a difference." Id.
67. United States v. Wright, 533 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Thomas
v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966), where the rule was established that a
court may not pressure a defendant to confess his guilt prior to imposition of sentence.
In Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1972), the rule was extended to
the situation where a trial court may pressure a defendant to admit his guilt in a crime
other than that to which he had originally pleaded.
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defendant exhibits no remorse for his crime."8
One final situation which requires attention is sentencings in the
context of plea bargains. In this setting, it is important that the judge
know all of the terms of a plea agreement before imposing sentence. If
the sentence is entirely within statutory limits, but the judge is not
informed fully of the terms of the agreement, he will still be reversed
for a sentence based on what the judge perceives to be the defendant's
non-compliance with those terms. 9 In accepting a guilty plea, it is also
imperative that the district judge personally advise the defendant of the
maximum possible penalties. Permitting the United States Attorney to
advise the defendant of the maximum possible sentence, instead of the
judge doing it personally, constitutes reversible error. 7
4. CONCLUSION
Although the cases may seem to create unnecessary exceptions and
overly complex issues, the time honored general rule that sentencing is
a discretionary function stands basically intact. Judges should keep in
mind the motive behind the latest amendment to Federal Rule 32(c),7
which is accuracy of information. All protections given to a convicted
defendant serve that single function. The law allows a judge to consider
a wide range of human qualities and instances of conduct on the part
of the defendant, but the judge's sources of information must have some
indicia of reliability. If that purpose is honored, and the various proce-
dures supporting it are followed, sentences within the statutory maxi-
mum will probably not be vacated on appeal.
68. United States v. Richardson, 582 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978).
69. United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case, the
government mentioned no conditions of cooperation when the guilty plea was accepted
by the district court. However, at sentencing, it argued to the court that the defendant
had not fulfilled his part of the bargain because he had not cooperated. The sentence
was vacated and remanded to another judge for resentencing.
70. United States v. Clark, 574 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978).
71. See note 22 supra.
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